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The Rise and Fall of Medicare
 
We are coming to the end of Medicare as we know it.  This end
will come about not because Medicare is not popular and not because
the reason for Medicare’s existence is past, but because Medicare’s
financing cannot sustain its expenditures.  Spiraling per-capita benefit
costs and the prospect of an avalanche of new members in the program
will force Congress to find new revenues or to drastically cut benefits.
The natural questions are: How did we get here?  And, why didn’t we
see the crisis coming?  Yet the answers to these questions only give us
the source of our problems and not the solution, if there is one.  In this
book, we follow Medicare through its relatively short life, pointing out
the reasons for the briefness of its healthy period and proposing a per-
manent solution to the crisis.  We deal with all three aspects of the
Medicare program that have worked together to get us to the current
situation: a payment scheme that ensures the users of the system will
not care what it costs; a financing system that involves generation
transfers as its principal source of revenue; and the penchant of Con-
gress to fund “worthy” causes with any funds that appear available.
The remainder of this chapter presents an overview of the factors that
have resulted in the potential insolvency of Medicare and our solution
to the Medicare crisis. 
 
WHO PAYS AND THE ESCALATING PER-CAPITA COST
OF MEDICARE
 
As a point of departure, consider the difference between the full-
page grocery store advertisements that appear in every daily newspaper
and those touting your local hospital or health care provider.  The gro-
cery store ads, no matter in what city they appear, are dominated by
one thing: the price of the advertised goods.  Health care firms also
advertise, and their ads inform us about why we should use their
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respective facilities, but price is never mentioned.  Only the nonprice
components of care are the subject of hospital and medical clinic ads.
Why is price prominent in grocery advertising but never mentioned
in ads for hospitals or medical clinics?  The reason is simple, and it is a
major reason for the escalating per-capita cost of Medicare:  the major-
ity of consumers of medical care are not concerned about its cost
because they aren’t paying for it (at least not directly).  Because buyers
are not concerned about medical care costs, the sellers of medical care
aren’t either.  Consumers are happy to demand state-of-the-art care,
and providers are happy to supply it.
Consider hospitals, for example.  Well over 90% of all payments to
hospitals in the year 1990 were not paid by the recipients of hospital
services.  For physicians services, over 80% of all payments were not
paid by patients.  Even for dental services and prescription drugs, rela-
tive newcomers to the prepaid insurance market, more than 50% of
payments in 1990 were not made by the patients.  If the patients aren’t
paying, who is?  The payers are the federal government, through Medi-
care, and the patients, indirectly through various medical prepayment
plans (commonly known as medical insurance, although the insurance
companies simply administer group plans and are not at risk as they
would be if insurance was really involved).  
Private insurance, or prepaid medical care, works this way.  Sup-
pose you are fully aware that your next year’s group premiums depend
solely on your group’s expenditures this year.  Suppose further that you
are a member of a group of 1,000 and contemplate an additional
$1,000 worth of medical services.  This extra $1,000 in expenditures
will raise your next year’s premium only one dollar, because the other
999 members will pay the rest ($1 each).  Thus, you have every incen-
tive to treat medical care as essentially free.  Furthermore, you can’t
expect the providers of medical care to be concerned about the cost if
you are not.  In this type of environment, no hospital will advertise
price, but rather what state-of-the-art services they can provide.  After
all, you can and will pay anything, because you are not actually pay-
ing; your fellow workers are.
Imagine if the air-travel market operated the same way as the mar-
ket for health care.  You are in Florida and want to travel to California.
Your choices are 1) fly from, say, Orlando to Los Angeles on any major
carrier in coach for perhaps $500; 2) fly the same route and carrier first
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class for $2,000; 3) fly the space shuttle at a full cost of $50 million
(assuming convenience of schedule and flight safety were equal to
those of the airlines).  Looking at actual travel statistics, most Ameri-
cans choose the $500 coach ticket.  Why?  Because they are paying for
the ticket.  The airlines know this and spend a lot of money telling pro-
spective travelers what it will cost to fly on their airline.  Now imagine
you had Travelcare insurance that was operated in the same manner as
most U.S. health insurance.  Voila!  Now all three modes of travel cost
you the same.  You can opt for first class or the space shuttle for the
same price as coach.  How many coach seats do you think travelers
would demand?  How many coach seats would airlines supply?  You
would be right if you said, “none.”  What would airline advertisements
look like?  Well, you can be sure they would not mention the price of
the ticket.  You can also be sure that the NASA budget would be much
higher as more and more shuttle trips were flown.
To see the impact on the industry of who pays, consider the follow-
ing facts.  The real cost of a hospital room adjusted for the change in
consumer prices has risen over 450% during the last 30 years.  In con-
trast, the adjusted costs of physician services and dentist services have
risen 170% and 130%, respectively, while that of pharmaceuticals has
fallen 20%.  What is different about these latter three categories of
medical care?  Why is there such a difference in real costs relative to
the hospital sector?  Perhaps the answers are in who is paying.  For
example, on average over the last 30 years, hospital patients paid less
than 13% of all hospital bills and real costs have risen at 5% per year.
Patients have paid on average less than 40% of physicians’ bills and
real costs have risen just under 2% per year.  On the other hand,
patients have on average paid more than 75% of their dental bills and
the real cost of dental services has risen less than 1% per year; like-
wise, they have paid more than 80% of all their prescription bills, and
real costs have fallen at an annual rate of just less than 1% per year.
These are powerful facts that relate real increases in costs of medical
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THE TRAGEDY OF MEDICARE FINANCING
 
When the Social Security Act was passed in 1935, the financing
was envisioned as being fully funded by those working, so that when
they retired there would be enough in the “Old-Age Reserve Account”




  Through a combination of failure to enact
the programmed tax increases, premature initiation of payments to
retirees, and expansion of benefits, the trustees of the Social Security
Trust Fund estimate that the fund will be bankrupt by the year 2029.
When Medicare was passed and the Medicare Trust Fund was estab-
lished in 1965, there was never any pretense that the “trust funds” in
that fund would be adequate to pay for the health care expenditures of
the covered population.  Not surprisingly, then, bankruptcy of the
Medicare Trust Fund is expected by the year 2007.
As bad as all this sounds, the real issue may be even worse.  The
Social Security and Medicare trust funds—indeed, all government trust
funds—are not trust funds at all.  A trust fund, as you and I use this
term, means resources put away to meet some future contingency.
However, that is not what the Social Security and Medicare trust funds
are.  The assets of government trust funds are promises of the govern-
ment to use future tax revenues to pay for the future expenditures that
are guaranteed by the trust funds.  These promises are not the source of
any future revenues, and that is the problem.
As originally conceived, the Social Security Trust Fund (the name
was changed from the Old-Age Reserve Account in 1939) was to buy
in the market outstanding U.S. government bonds.  The purchase of
these bonds would have indeed represented a real investment, because
these purchases would have reduced the future commitment of the gov-
ernment to pay interest on the purchased bonds, making these
resources available for the retired.  What in fact has occurred is that the
tax revenues flowing into the trust funds have been treated as normal
tax revenues to be spent on general expenditures; new, special U.S.
government bonds have been issued and placed into the trust funds,
which increases the net indebtedness of the government but is never
entered in any official accounting of the outstanding federal debt.
To better see the relation between what a trust fund contains and
that fund’s ability to finance future expenditures, let us consider an
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education trust fund established for a newborn child.  Consider two
types of assets in a college education trust fund for this child: bonds
issued by entities other than yourself and bonds issued by you.  In the
former case, the trust fund has as its assets the ownership of income
that others are legally obligated to pay to the trust.  As a result, if the
college education of your children depends only on the ability or the
financial status of the issuers of the bonds to repay when your child
enrolls in college, you have prepaid for your children’s education.  On
the other hand, if the trust fund has as its assets only your promise to
pay for your children’s college education when they enroll in college,
there is no prepayment.  Imagine that you place in the trust fund each
year 15.3% of your earnings (15.3% is equal to the sum of the 12.4%
Social Security tax and the 2.9% Medicare tax).  Instead of investing
this money in stocks or bonds each year, you take the money back out,
spend it on a trip to Europe, and replace it with a promise to pay the
trust fund when your children enroll in college.  Now the costs of your
children’s college education depend solely on your willingness to
reduce your living standard by an amount equal to the costs of college
education for your children.  The education of your children depends





The Social Security and Medicare trust funds both have earmarked
revenues from payroll taxes placed in them, and thus they have all the
appearances of the first form of a college education trust fund, one in
which real assets are put away to pay future expenditures.  It is the next
step that is crucial to what has happened to these two trust funds.  The
government takes the income going into the trust funds and replaces it
with its own promises to pay in the future.  This is not a problem if the
government invests the trust fund revenues in real social overhead cap-
ital that enhances the real productive capacity of the nation, because
when the time comes to use the trust funds, the ability of the govern-
ment to pay the cost has been enhanced because of the real investments
made.  Unfortunately, even a casual look at the federal budget over the
past 20 years indicates that the revenues have all been spent on current
consumption rather than on investment.
In every sense, the Social Security and Medicare trust funds are
fiction.  There are no resources put aside to meet the future expendi-
tures that these trust funds were designed to insure.  As a result, if the
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Medicare Trust Fund’s “value” were sufficient to pay for Medicare for
the entire millennium, the taxpayers of this nation would be no better
off: every dollar of Medicare expenditures for the millennium would
still have to come from taxpayers at the time of these expenditures.
There simply is nothing real in the Medicare Trust Fund.  
In another sense, this fact does not matter.  Only if the nation is
willing to tighten its belt will it have the real resources necessary to
provide for the retirement and health care of a growing elderly popula-
tion.  If we are not willing to do this, then we must begin to put some-
thing real away.  If the government will not invest for the future, then




In addition to the lack of real assets in the Medicare Trust Fund,
Medicare’s funding problems have been exacerbated by expansion of
its original scope.  By 1972, Congress was already finding worthy
causes on which to spend the excess of Medicare tax revenues over
actual Medicare expenditures, making the all-but-fictitious trust fund
balance even smaller than it would have been.  These causes were in
three areas: an expansion of those eligible to receive Medicare benefits,
an expansion of the benefits themselves, and other non-Medicare but
health care–related expenditures.
Legislation approved in 1972 extended Medicare coverage to dis-
abled persons under age 65 who were eligible for benefits under Social
Security or Railroad Retirement and to certain other individuals under
age 65 suffering end-stage renal disease.  Coverage was also extended
to any individual not eligible for Medicare as a result of not being eligi-
ble for Social Security or Railroad Retirement who was aged 65 or
older and enrolled in the voluntary Supplemental Medical Insurance
(SMI) program.  In 1985, Medicare benefits were extended to state and
local government employees not covered by Social Security, and cov-
erage was also extended to include spouses of workers who were not
currently covered but would be eligible.  Finally, in 1986, Medicare
was made the secondary payer for individuals and their spouses when
their work-supplied health care insurance was exhausted.
 
The Economics of Medicare Reform 7
 
By 1967, Congress was already adding to the benefits of Medicare:
60 additional days of in-patient hospital care were added to the lifetime
limit.  In 1972, payment for the services of interns and residents in
podiatry training was added to the benefit package.  In 1980, unlimited
home health visits were allowed, as was the use of alcohol detoxifica-





  The only break in this steady expansion of benefits occurred
with the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1998.  The BBA, in an effort
to reduce the deficit in the flow of funds into the Medicare Trust Fund,
moved home-health-care coverage from the Hospital Insurance portion
of Medicare—the part of Medicare directly funded by the Medicare tax
and for which the Medicare Trust Fund applies—to the SMI portion of
Medicare.  This move did nothing real except to take expenditures out
of one category and place them in another; total expenditures remained
the same.  It saved the trust fund, but there is nothing in the trust fund,
so the future tax implications of the program remain unchanged.
Quite possibly the most controversial use of Medicare tax receipts
has been subsidies to teaching hospitals to aid in the training of physi-
cians.  This program represented a significant subsidy to those few hos-
pitals that were in the program.  These funds subsidized both the
training of physicians and the use of the hospitals by indigent patients.
Both of these uses might have been worthy of support, but if they were





In addition to financing and program expansion, demographics
plays an important role in the Medicare problem.  Over the next 30
years in the United States, and in the rest of the developed world as
well, increased longevity combined with lower fertility will result in an
increased proportion of population that is above a constant retirement
age.  In most of the developed world, the fertility rate is below the pop-
ulation-sustaining rate, a fact in startling contrast to the predictions of
the Club of Rome that population growth would be the bane of the 21st
century.  It appears that the economics of procreation have moved us
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from a world of exploding population to one of perhaps declining pop-
ulation.  The trend toward slower population growth, while not carried
as far as in the developed countries, has even hit the emerging coun-
tries: the developing countries of the Pacific Rim are also seeing
declining fertility.  Figure 1.1 shows the expected change in regional
population between 1999 and 2030.  Europe’s population will decline
5%; at the other extreme, the Middle East’s and Africa’s populations
are expected to grow by over 80%.  In the United States, the population
is expected to grow by 27%.  Given that the U.S. fertility rate is 2.07,
most of the growth will be due to immigration.    
In 1965, 40% (77 million) of the U.S. population was 19 or
younger; 20 years earlier, 33% of the population had been 19 or
younger.  This dramatic change in the age distribution of the U.S. pop-
ulation provided the potential for change in the nation.  As this genera-
tion (referred to as the “baby boom”) has grown up, it has had a
profound impact on America’s culture and its economy.  Products have
 
Figure 1.1 Change in Population 1999–2000 (%)
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been designed for the baby boomers and marketing campaigns have
been pitched toward them.  More importantly, the biggest impact of
these same baby boomers is yet to be experienced, and not just here at
home, but worldwide.
Currently, members of the baby boom generation are experiencing
their peak earnings years, they dominate politics, and their voting
behavior shapes public policy.  In a few years they will retire, and again
they will be part of a dramatic change in the age distribution of the
U.S. population.  Once again, this generation will provide the potential
for change in the nation, but this time the change will occur as a result
of the agedness, rather than the youthfulness, of the population.  What
changes can we anticipate and how widespread will these changes be?
The answer requires some background concerning where the United
States fits among the rest of the world’s population distributions.  
North America and Europe together account for only 13.7% of the
world’s population, but they produce almost 60% of the world’s output.
Over the next 30 years, the combined population in North America and
Europe will drop to 10.6% of the total.  Because of significant expected
immigration, the North American population share is expected to
decline only 7.8% while Europe’s population share is expected to fall
31%.  
The combination of the post-war baby boom in the developed
world and declining fertility portend great changes in the age composi-
tion of the world’s population.  For the developed world, the elderly
(defined as individuals 65 years of age or older) currently comprise
between 12% and 16% of the population (Figure 1.2).  In Europe as a
whole, the elderly account for 15.4%; in France, 16%; in Germany,
16.1%; in England, 15.7%; and in Italy, 17.9%.  In Japan, 16.5% of the
population is over 65, and in the United States, 12.6%.
Over the next 30 years, dramatic increases in the proportion of the
population that is elderly will force significant adjustments to govern-
ment-sponsored pension programs and health care programs that redis-
tribute from workers to retirees.  By 2030, the elderly in Europe will
account for more than 25% of the total population: 29.6% in Germany,
25.8% in France, 23.5% in Britain, and a startling 29.3% in Italy.  In
the United States, 20% of the population will be 65, and in Japan,
27.4%.
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The proportion of elderly matters because the world’s output is
basically produced by the young.  Most countries have social insurance
contracts that encourage the elderly to leave the labor force as a result
of labor policies that are still dominated by the Great Depression
notion that jobs are limited; by discouraging work by the elderly, we
save jobs for the young.  These policies fail to view labor as a resource
(in fact, as the main engine of output).  As the age composition of the
population changes, the share of the world’s workers that reside in
Europe and the United States will fall.  Equally as important as who
produces the world’s output is who consumes the output.  Currently,
the elderly in the developed world consume between 12 and 17% of
total production.  By the year 2030, their consumption will rise to
between 25 and 32%!  In Europe, the elderly will be consuming well
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over 30% of all production; in the United States and Canada, the eld-
erly will consume 25%.
Virtually every country in the world has engaged in a system of
taxing workers to ensure the retirement benefits of the elderly.  When
these systems were instituted, the population share of the elderly was
very small and the population was growing at fertility rates well above
population sustaining rates.  Thus, the proportion of the population that
reached retirement age was very small relative to the number of work-
ers, and, as a consequence, the burden on the young of providing for
the consumption of the elderly was small.  A further consequence was
a small effect on any nation’s capital stock.  Now, everything has
changed, and the whole system is about to topple, which will place
every country in a funding dilemma.  
How the funding dilemma is solved has deep meaning for the
future, especially for the next 30 years.  When we do long-term plan-
ning, we consider how governments will deal with this pending crisis.
Privatization of elderly entitlements, including Medicare, is a way to
capture the productive capacity of the current population bulge that
exists in all of the developed countries.  Many of the countries of South
America have already privatized their social security systems; England
has partially privatized.  The alternative to privatization will be a rapid
and significant increase in taxation that elected representatives will find
unpalatable.  The required tax increase will bring the tax rate for fund-
ing current U.S. Social Security and Medicare entitlements to 22.12%.
If we wait until the problem arrives in earnest, the required tax rate will
be almost 29%.
What does the fact of declining fertility mean for the promises we
have made to provide for the health care of the elderly?  The genera-
tion-transfer system of finance works so long as the number of young
is growing rapidly.  A system that is based on population growth can-
not continue to provide expanding benefits when that necessary growth
stops.  The pending retirement of the baby boom generation magnifies
the inefficiencies inherent in the generation-transfer system of finance.
The current population of elderly stands at about 34 million and will
grow to approximately 39 million at the beginning of the baby boom
retirement.  In the next 28 years, the elderly population will almost
double.  When the last of the baby boomers retire in 2029, the elderly
population will stand at approximately 67 million.  At that time there
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will be 2.2 workers per retiree, down from a current level of 3.9 work-
ers per retiree.
In the United States, there are myriad reform proposals being
offered in the current Congress that promise to overcome the funding
crisis facing Social Security.  A handful of these proposals include the
provision of establishing private retirement accounts.  Medicare’s
funding crisis is equally severe, but prefunding the program has
received little attention.  The provision of health care for the elderly
population can be made less sensitive to demographic changes if steps
are taken to move current Medicare to prefunded, no-first-dollar-cover-
age retirement health care and to reduce the incentives to retire early.
These demographics are hard to escape.  We must either raise taxes sig-
nificantly or reform the system, but only reform has any chance of
reducing the pain by providing the means of producing the output that





Any complete solution to the problems of Medicare must address
both the flow cost of the system and its ability to provide for future
recipients.  On a flow-cost basis, the Medicare system is already in def-
icit because the current benefits paid are in excess of current revenues.
Thus, we are now drawing down the trust fund, meaning that current
tax revenues (which could have been tax cuts) are funding current
Medicare expenditures because the trust fund contains only promises
to use tax revenues for Medicare.  In the following chapters, we will
present an approach that is based on each generation prepaying its own
Medicare.  While prepaying can ensure that the resources necessary to
provide benefits in the future are in place, it does not solve the flow
cost problem.  For this, we design an alternative benefit package and
price this package.  Our package, on a total out-of-pocket-cost-to-
recipient basis, is only marginally different from current Medicare;
however, the incentive structure is very different.  The difference in
incentives has the potential of bringing the market to bear on Medicare
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expenditures, resulting in both the buyers and sellers of health care ser-
vices caring what it costs.
In order to concentrate on the primary issue of providing health
care for the aged population, the original purpose of Medicare, we peel
away all the non-aged benefits of the current Medicare program.  This
is not to say that these programs are without merit, but simply that their
inclusion confounds the analysis of dealing with the problem of the
cost and financing of health care for the aged.  In effect, there are many
reasons for engaging in transfers from one group of society to another,
but we are restricting ourselves to the study of transfers that are related
to age and nothing else.  In particular, transfers to the poor are not con-
sidered, because being poor is not age-related.  In a sense, all poor
should be treated by the system in a similar manner, independent of
age.
Because we are discussing the provision of health care for the
aged, the question arises as to how this differs from other programs
designed to provide for the consumption expenditures of the aged, such
as Social Security or other retirement plans.  Our answer is that on one
hand, there is no difference, and on the other hand, the difference is
overwhelming.  The similarity lies in the fundamental fact that both
provide for the consumption expenditures of the elderly population.
The difference, however, is twofold.  First, as a society we have
decided that we will not tolerate great differences in the level of health
care provided for the aged, regardless of ability to pay.  As a result,
there is little incentive for the young to provide for their own retire-
ment health care.  Second, because of rapid changes in technology, we
have converted many aspects of what was once considered part of the
normal aging process to a medical condition, thus expanding expendi-
tures on health care.  As a result, the level of uncertainty in future
health care expenditures is far greater than for general living expenses.
The current structure of Medicare combines the worst of incentives
on the market side with a financing system that discourages saving for
the future.  The result is a lower capital stock for the nation which,
when coupled with the upcoming bulge in the population of the aged as
a result of the retirement of the baby boomers, is going to bring Medi-
care to its knees.  
We propose changing Medicare in two important ways.  First and
foremost, the generational transfer method of financing must be aban-
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doned; it results in a reduced capital stock and reduces work incen-
tives, both of which reduce national income.  Second, we propose
introducing health insurance with no first-dollar coverage.  Even
though in our solution the total out-of-pocket costs of serious illnesses
are the same as under current Medicare, the requirement that the first
dollars spent are the responsibility of the consumers will create incen-
tives to care what health care costs.  If consumers care, then competi-
tion will result in producers caring what health care costs.
We propose that each age cohort, defined as all individuals born
between January 1 and December 31 in any given year, insure itself
against retirement medical expenses.  Each worker within an age
cohort will make contributions that are direct offsets to their current
Medicare tax.  These contributions are placed into a Private Retirement
Insurance for Medical Expenditures (PRIME) account that, by the time
of the cohort’s retirement, will contain enough to pay for a lifetime of
retirement health care expenditures.  Because of the considerable
uncertainty concerning retirement health care expenditures at the time
a cohort begins contributing, the level of contributions must be
adjusted as a cohort ages and more information concerning future med-
ical needs is revealed.  An additional benefit of cohort-based financing
is that it eliminates cohort size risk of the type we are now facing with
the pending retirement of the baby boom generation.  If the population
age distribution experiences a bulge because of greater-than-normal
fertility or immigration, the contribution to retirement medical insur-
ance of these cohorts will rise, maintaining the same per-capita value
as that for smaller cohorts.
All individuals would be required to participate in the program we
are proposing.  The primary reason for mandatory participation is a
result of individuals’ incentives to underinsure themselves against
medical expenses that arise during retirement.  As a society, we have
made the decision that individual access to health care will not depend
on ability to pay.  Thus, individuals have incentives to save too little
during their working years to fund retirement health care; they expect
“society” to take care of them should they fall ill.
In the past, family units, through implicit intergenerational con-
tracts, provided this insurance function.  With today’s increased mobil-
ity and the changing dynamics of family units, a new means of
insurance is required.  Cohort-based insurance in which, at the mini-
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mum, all working individuals in a cohort pay into the system, ensures
that a sufficient level of assets will be set aside as the cohort ages.  By
forming cohort risk pools, mandatory participation also solves the
problem (i.e., adverse selection) that arises when individuals choose to
join the system only when they expect large medical expenses.
Insurance that comes into play only if an individual reaches the age
of 65 and has medical expenditures that exceed the policy’s annual
deductible requires smaller contributions than would a medical IRA.
Tying a mandatory life insurance program to the purchase of retirement
medical insurance simply increases the cost.  In addition, we already
have a mandatory life insurance program contained in Social Security.
Thus, our proposed new Medicare, just as the current Medicare pro-
gram, has no life insurance component and pays no death benefits to
survivors.  In its simplest form, catastrophic retirement health insur-
ance coverage is purchased during a worker’s years in the labor force,
the benefits of which are received only if the worker survives to retire-
ment.  The specific insurance we are proposing is comparable to
today’s $2,500 deductible policies, which pay all expenses above the
deductible.
Since our proposed insurance is universal, it must address the issue
of redistribution.  With cohort-based insurance, redistribution occurs
within each age cohort rather than between cohorts.  Within each age
cohort, workers subsidize nonworkers and high-wage earners subsidize
lower-wage earners.  As an age cohort enters the labor force, they do
not know who will survive to retirement, who will be sickly, or who
will be high-income earners.  At this time, they make a compact with
one another to pay the same percentage of their wages into a fund that
will purchase their retirement medical insurance, should they survive.
The level of retirement medical care that will be demanded by
today’s young workers is unknown, as is the composition and form of
that medical care.  Both of these sources of uncertainty affect the tim-
ing of the purchase of retirement health insurance.  Our approach does
not specify when retirement medical insurance will be purchased, but
the timing of the insurance purchase determines who bears the risks
associated with the medical care purchases that will be made by
today’s young workers when they are old.  The real question is, will
future retirees pay for their own retirement medical purchases or will
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When one considers the large difference in the potential unfunded
liability of the current system and our cohort-based alternative, one
wonders, where is the free lunch?  After a thorough look at our pro-
posal, however, it will be clear that there is no free lunch—but, there is
a considerably cheaper lunch that is of better quality than the one we
are currently committed to buying.  The current generation-transfer
system of financing Medicare reduces the nation’s capital stock and
thereby reduces national income.  By moving to prepaid financing, we
remove the disincentives to invest, and the nation will experience an
increase in its capital stock and income.  It is this increase in the capital
stock and national income that provides the additional resources avail-
able to pay off most, but not all, of the current system’s unfunded lia-
bility.  Moving to prepaid retirement health insurance is just good
business.
Even if it is good business to switch to cohort-based financing,
why is it so important to do it now?  The answer lies in the income-
generating power of the baby boom generation.  While the pending
retirement of the baby boomers looms like a dark cloud over the
present Medicare system, these same baby boomers can become our
saviors if we can harness their earning power.  To do this, we must act
quickly.  The baby boomers begin to reach 65 in 2011 and, given past
history, they will begin their exit from the labor force even sooner (as
soon as age 50, which was in the year 1996).  If we are to succeed in
making the transition to a fully funded Medicare system, we must
move all the baby boomers into the new system.  Each year we delay
acting costs us $100 billion.  We must face the fact that the promises
we have made to the elderly must be declared null and void  unless the
system is drastically changed.  
In our analysis, we show that using reasonable assumptions about
male and female earnings distributions and average rates of return on
investments in our nation’s capital stock, young cohorts can guarantee
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their retirement medical expenditures for a fraction of their current
Medicare taxes.  Moreover, by acting now, we can transition from the
current system to a cohort-based system for far less than the unfunded
liability implicit in our existing Medicare system.  In fact, the differ-
ence is staggering.  Using current Health Care Financing Administra-
tion estimates, the existing Medicare system has an unfunded liability
of over $9 trillion (or 2.5 times our current national debt).  Our system,
if adopted in the next two years, has a total unfunded liability of only





In Chapter 2, we present a history of Medicare that details the
political issues and population demographics that led to its adoption.
Our cohort-based solution to the Medicare crisis has as its cornerstone
the potential increase in the nation’s income that will result by moving
from a Medicare financed through intergenerational transfers to a
Medicare prepaid by each generation.  In Chapter 3, we present the




Any proposal that uses savings to finance retirement health care expen-
ditures must be based on estimates of both future earnings and health
care costs.  In Chapter 4, we present a detailed discussion of our earn-
ings forecasts.  These forecasts deal with several issues, such as labor
force participation rates and life cycle earnings profiles, to name just
two.  Chapter 5 provides the same level of detail for our estimates of
future retirement health care expenditures.  Chapter 6 presents our pro-
posal for a transition to a fully funded Medicare system.  Finally,




1. The trend is for all areas of medical care to have increased third-party participa-
tion, so that buyers are being taken out of the “who-cares-what-it-costs” loop.
Patients currently pay less than 20% of doctor bills and less than 50% of dental
and prescription bills.  As expected, the real inflation rates of these aspects of
medical care have shown a significant increase in the last decade.
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2. See A.W. Willcox (1937) for a complete discussion of the act and the public
finance aspects of the Old-Age Reserve Account, now referred to as the Social
Security Trust Fund.
3. We should note here that if the trust fund buys back some of your outstanding debt
rather than using it to support your current consumption, then the result is exactly
the same as buying bonds from others.  The proceeds in the trust fund represent a
net addition to your asset position and are therefore available for use later.  If, on
the other hand, you simply issue bonds to the trust fund and spend the proceeds on
current consumption, there is a deterioration in your net asset position and there
are no funds available for use later.
4. An excellent review of the history of Medicare provisions is contained in the
annual statistical supplement to the 1996 
 




5. Of necessity, Chapter 3 is abstract, although the heavy mathematics is relegated to
an appendix.  If the reader is willing to accept the theoretical propositions that
intergenerational transfers reduce national income and that we can restore this lost
income by moving to a prepaid system, then nothing is lost by skipping Chapter 3
and moving immediately to Chapter 4.
